Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are attractive when the bidders' valuations on bundles exhibit complementarity and/or substitutability. An important problem is that of eliciting the bidders' preferences so that they do not have to bid on all combinations. We present a new family of preference elicitation algorithms. The algorithms in this family do not rely on absolute bids, but rather on relative (differential) value information. This holds the promise to reduce revelation and communication significantly. We develop a differential-elicitation algorithm that finds the efficient allocation of items to the bidders, and as a side-effect, the Vickrey payments (which make truthful bidding incentive compatible). We also present two auction mechanisms that use differential elicitation.
INTRODUCTION AND DETAILS
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders' valuations on bundles exhibit complementarity (a bundle of items is worth more than the sum of its parts) and/or substitutability (a bundle is worth less than the sum of its parts). An important problem is that of bidding. There are 2 m − 1 bundles, and each bidder may need to bid on all of them to fully express its preferences. This can be undesirable for any of several reasons: (1a) determining one's valuation for any given bundle can be computationally intractable [11, 9] ; (1b) there is a huge number of bundles to evaluate; (2) communicating the bids can incur prohibitive overhead (e.g., network traffic); and (3) bidders may prefer not to reveal all of their valuation information due to reasons of privacy or long-term competitiveness.
We study the setting in which a benevolent auctioneer wants to implement an efficient allocation of a set of heterogeneous, indivisible goods. The preferences of the participating bidders (or consumers) are private information and utility is transferable via money. The auctioneer tries to design a mechanism that gives no incentive for the bidders to misreport preferences. It is well known that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (aka. Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA)), that is based on exhaustively eliciting all utilities, is such an incentive compatible mechanism. However, in that mechanism, each bidder evaluates each of the exponentially many bundles, and communicates a value for each one.
1 This is clearly impractical even for auctions with moderate numbers of goods.
Consider the following: the (rational) preferences of bidders can be ranked (from most preferred towards least preferred). Each rank uniquely represents a bundle (bundles with consecutive ranks may have identical valuations). Combining the individual ranks will lead to combinations of ranks (respectively combinations of ranked bundles); some of them are feasible. All combinations form a lattice along a (weak) dominance relation . This lattice structure can be utilized to guide a (best-first) search through the space of combinations. This idea has been exploited in [3, 5] to design an efficient, (individually) incentive compatible mechanism for combinatorial auctions. The mechanism may reduce the amount of elicited information in comparison to GVAs. The mechanism asks each bidder for the (true) valuations of (a subset of) the bundles. We called this a partial-revelation mechanism. Recently, it has been shown that this method, and related elicitation methods, may lead to significant savings in the amount of information that is elicited from the bidders (compared to the full elicitation of the GVA),see [6] .
Below we present mechanisms that does not elicit absolute valuations but differences between valuations and, thus, possibly reveal only a fraction of each value information to the auctioneer. We present an algorithm to explore the rank lattice using differential value information. The algorithm determines an efficient allocation. It inherits the partial revelation properties of the algorithm discussed in [5] , while saving the bidder from specifying absolute valuations. We show that differential information suffices to determine the Vickrey payments and that all information necessary to compute the payments is available once the algorithm has determined an efficient allocation.
Computing an Efficient Allocation
The algorithm is based on the EBF (Efficient Best First) algorithm that we studied in [5] . DE denotes differential elicitation.
(
if n ∈ OPEN then OPEN = OPEN ∪{n} The algorithm utilizes the lattice structure to avoid the exploration of combinations that cannot be efficient. In each round, it determines a set M of the most promising candidates. To do so, it considers all combinations in the set OPEN. Given a combination k, ∆ k is a lower bound on the difference between the value of k and the value of the best combination, that is (1, . . . , 1). Initially, all bounds are non-tight and zero. Tight(k) is true iff the bound is tight. In this case, ∆ k is the precise difference, otherwise ∆ k is not larger than the precise difference. A candidate is promising if its bound is tight and not larger than any other bound. Details of an actual mechanism depend on the way in which information about the differences will be elicited (see below). If certain invariants are assumed, the following can be shown (for details and all proofs, see [4] 
): Any algorithm of the EBF-DE family determines an efficient (that is, welfare-maximizing) allocation.
The choice of the next combination to be expanded is not deterministically specified above if promising combinations have the same value. So, actually, a family of algorithms, differing with respect to their tie-breaking rule, is outlined above.
Vickrey Payments
Recall that the Vickrey payment of a bidder reflects the effect of her participation in an economy: she will pay an amount equal to the utility that the other bidders will loose due to her participation. Now assume that an execution of an EBF-DE algorithm has determined an efficient allocation. The following holds: No information in addition to the information already obtained by EBF-DE is necessary to determine the Vickrey payments.
Eliciting Valuation Differentials
To further complete the ingredients necessary for a mechanism, we outline two elicitation policies that can be used to collect the information that is required in step (3) of the algorithm.
Difference Increment Mechanism: In each step (3), the complete set of combinations with the currently smallest tight difference is determined. This may require to tighten non-tight differences. Remember that a combination consists of individual ranks and that each rank represents a bundle. There are individual differences δi that measure the difference in value between the considered bundle and the bundle most preferred by i. If the difference of the combination is not tight, there must be at least one individual difference that is not tight. Assume that ci identifies a rank/agent pair with a non-tight difference. To tighten the bound, the following query will be submitted to i: Is the difference between your valuation of the most preferred bundle and the valuation of the bundle at rank ci larger than δi? If the answer is "yes", δi can be incremented. Otherwise the difference is tight.
Difference Mechanism: Instead the precise difference can be requested: Give me the difference between your valuation of the most preferred bundle and the valuation for the bundle at rank ci?
Properties
From both types of queries, rank-based mechanisms utilizing differential elicitation (called RANK-DE mechanisms) can be constructed such that the following holds: RANK-DE mechanisms are (individually) incentive compatible and economically efficient.
A difference increment mechanism reveals never more information than a difference mechanism. However, depending on the problem instance, each mechanism may dominate the other in terms of communication costs. Partial preference elicitation reduces the cognitive burden of the bidders because they do not have to evaluate all bundles. Furthermore, for some bundles only a fraction of the valuation has to be determined. The mechanisms do not require per se that the bidders are aware of the complete ranking of their preferences. A bidder may start with a rough categorization of his preferences that can be refined during the course of the mechanism.
CONCLUSION
An important related research thread studies iterative or progressive auction protocols that are price-based [8, 10, 2, 1, 12] ). Minimizing revelation is also a relevant (and sometimes achievable) objective for these mechanisms. Space does not suffice for a detailed discussion, but note that prices induce additional communication requirements and that it can be difficult or impossible to reach an equilibrium in a strategy-proof manner for the general case.
Above, we introduced a new family of preference elicitation algorithms. Relative (differential) value information is elicited. This holds the promise to reduce the revelation of bidders' evaluations significantly. In addition, it may be easier for the bidder to determine differences in valuation than to determine the absolute level of valuations.We outlined two differential-elicitation mechanisms that find the efficient allocation, and as a side-effect, the Vickrey payments (which make truthful bidding incentive compatible).
